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 FROM CANNIBALISM TO EMPOWERMENT:
 AN ANALECTS-INSPIRED ATTEMPT TO BALANCE
 COMMUNITY AND LIBERTY
 Sor-hoon Tan
 Philosophy Department, National University of Singapore
 ... across every page were the words BENEVOLENCE, RIGHTEOUSNESS, and MORALITY.... [Flinally I began
 to make out what was written between the lines; the whole volume was filled with a single phrase: EAT
 PEOPLE!
 Lu Xun'
 The Confucian tradition has often been credited with a strong allegiance to the value
 of community. It recognizes that certain goods might be attained through special
 forms of human association, but not by any solitary individual. Are such community
 goods attained at the expense of the liberty of individual members? Philosophers
 have struggled with the tension between liberty and community since the dawn of
 Western philosophy. Aristotle complained about the false idea of liberty as "doing
 what one likes," which is contradictory to the true interests of the polis.2 Such lib-
 erty, or rather license, is undoubtedly detrimental to any peaceful coexistence, not to
 say the harmonious and mutually beneficial association of community. Without
 regulation, such license would, according to Thomas Hobbes, result in a "war of all
 against all," making life "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short."
 It is not just illiberal philosophers who are concerned about liberty turning to
 license and destroying itself. John Stuart Mill remarked, "Freedom for the pikes is
 death for the minnows." While recognizing a need to limit liberty, liberals are
 also perennially concerned that any group exercising power over individuals might
 deny members their status qua separate and autonomous individuals, and thereby
 threaten liberty. On the other hand, communitarians object, among other things, to
 the liberal conception of autonomous selves as fundamentally, even ontologically,
 separate units, who then choose whether or not to enter into relations with one
 another to form communities. From such a starting point, community goods are often
 neglected, and in extreme cases the insistence on the priority of individual rights
 could lead to "the moral fabric of community ... unraveling around us."3
 While it is not impossible, with human intelligence and imagination, to resolve
 the conflicts between community goods and individual liberty, and while there are
 circumstances in which one could benefit the other, or both could be mutually
 beneficial, the likelihood of tension and outright contradiction between these two
 key values of democracy remains, in any group of human beings, blessed or cursed,
 depending on how you look at it, with what Kant calls "the unsocial sociability of
 men, that is, their tendency to come together in society, coupled, however, with a
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 continual resistance which constantly threatens to break this society up." The aver-
 age person is torn between the conflicting inclinations to live in society and to live as
 an individual, among fellows "whom he cannot bear yet cannot bear to leave."4 We
 value liberty for the protection it provides for the individual, for its empowerment of
 her in her search for human fulfillment. The value of community captures our con-
 cern to render our unavoidable social existence as meaningful and beneficial as
 possible for all, or at least for as many as possible. The need to balance the two
 values-a perennial problem of ethics and politics-has been brought to the fore by
 the liberalism-communitarianism debate.5
 This essay aims to develop an account of how to balance liberty and community
 through what Confucians called ii 6, which has been translated as "rites," "rituals,"
 "ceremony," "ritual action," "ritual propriety," "propriety," "decorum," "manners,"
 "courtesy," and "civility." I shall adopt the translation of "ritual." While I draw
 most of my textual materials from the Analects, I do not offer my perspective as a
 straightforward interpretation of its content; the problematic of liberty versus com-
 munity is not germane to pre-Qin philosophical discourse. This exercise is motivated
 by a belief that the Analects, together with an interdisciplinary study of ritual in
 different contexts, could provide resources for new ways of handling the tension
 between liberty and community.
 Confucianism's Hostility to Liberty
 Focusing on historical practices, many have accused Confucianism of having no
 place for individual liberty. Writers like Lucian Pye and W.J.F. Jenner have blamed
 Confucianism for China's authoritarian social structure and political culture.6 Lest it
 be thought that this is just a simple case of cultural imperialism, or of ignorant bar-
 barians pontificating on things they know little about, Chinese writers like Fei Xiao-
 tong and Ch'O T'ung-tsu have presented Chinese traditional society, usually deemed
 Confucian, in ways that justify the conclusion that Confucianism is hostile to indi-
 vidual liberty-a view still prevalent among many Chinese and other East Asians
 who could claim a Confucian legacy.7
 Some scholars have tried to rescue Confucianism from such charges by arguing
 that there is a strand of liberal thought in the tradition, based on the expressed ideals
 of self-cultivation and ethico-poliltical practices that sanction challenges to author-
 ity. Others have emphasized the humanistic character of Confucian philosophy, re-
 gardless of historical malpractices. Insofar as they have reconciled liberty and com-
 munity in Confucianism, these approaches have been assisted by challenges to the
 liberal conception of the self and by arguments that Confucian conceptions of the
 self as fundamentally relational have a better chance of resolving the traditional
 contradictions between self and society.
 Some have argued that the key ideal of ren It (what Wing-tsit Chan considers
 the general virtue of "humanity") provides a meaningful synthesis of individual
 liberty and community. While I agree with that suggestion, focusing on this most
 benign and too readily acceptable ethical notion, especially when we translate it as
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 "benevolence," is too easy a way out if we do not tackle the close connection
 between ren and li. Even the severest critics of Confucianism have little to say
 against ren-at most they attack the failure of practice to live up to theory; but the
 ethical value of Confucian ritual has always been more problematic. On the other
 hand, Confucianism's hostility to individual liberty has often been attributed to the
 Confucian li, equated with traditional and conventional "rules of conduct," which
 historically were sometimes so destructive of individuals that they were condemned
 for "cannibalism."
 I propose to rescue the Confucian concept of li from such charges and show that
 it should instead be understood as a concept of moral empowerment of the free
 individual in community. Moreover, as a concept about empowerment it is still rel-
 evant to contemporary society and can offer some clues on how contemporary
 Confucians might balance liberty and community.
 Creating Community through Ritual
 While there is no consensus among contemporary scholars who study rituals in
 various contexts, the Confucian li fits quite comfortably into Eric Rothenbuhler's
 definition of ritual as "voluntary performance of appropriately patterned behavior
 to symbolically affect or participate in the serious life."8 Ritual is the constitutive
 means of Confucian community. Robert Eno presents early Confucianism not pri-
 marily as a body of doctrine but as a community with ritual activity as its distin-
 guishing core. The Analects contain "not merely instructive sayings of the Master
 but inter-subjectively validated ideas, communal values exemplified by life experi-
 ences of the speakers in the act of li."9 Creating community through ritual is central
 to Confucianism. As a norm to aspire to, Confucian community should be under-
 stood not as a closed collective-an abstract entity to be set above its individual
 members-but as an open network of relationships.10 What separates one such
 community from another community is a matter of relatively weak, marginal rela-
 tionships, not necessarily a total absence of relationship. A community grows or
 shrinks according to the changing number and strengths of its constituting relation-
 ships.
 Borrowing a metaphor from the works of David Hall and Roger Ames, a Con-
 fucian community may be considered a field constituted by multiple foci, which are
 members of the community."1 A member's personal cultivation (xiu shen fIJ)
 results in an increase in intensity or extension of focus. Improving a relationship so
 that more is achieved cooperatively within that relationship would be an increase in
 intensity; increasing the number of relationships that are productive of communal
 good would be an extension of focus. Extension of focus might be within the existing
 field of a community, or it might increase the field if new relationships involve in-
 dividuals who are not members of the community. Hence, both qualitatively and
 quantitatively, personal growth and communal growth are interdependent.
 The goal of Confucian personal cultivation is to achieve authoritative "human-
 ity" (ren-which is more often translated as "benevolence"). Tu Wei-ming has ana-
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 lyzed the Chinese character for ren as "man-in-society": it points toward the funda-
 mental relational characteristic of the Confucian conception of the person and the
 mutual implication of personal cultivation and community creation.12 In Confu-
 cianism, ritual is central to this process of personal-communal growth. "Through
 self-discipline and observing ritual (li), one becomes authoritative in one's conduct
 (ren)."13 The meaning and value of ritual lie in its being a constitutive means of
 community through authoritative conduct (Analects 3.3, 4.13).
 A community achieved through Confucian rituals is one that places a high value
 on harmony. According to Master You, who was said to resemble Confucius,
 "Achieving harmony is the most valuable function of observing ritual propriety"
 (Analects 1.12). Valuing harmony need not mean denying the existence, even the
 inevitability, of conflict in human interaction.14 Ritual might contribute to communal
 harmony by limiting the damage that results from conflict by creating artificial
 boundaries in social interaction. Take, for example, two family members working
 together in a company. Addressing each other by their official titles and adhering to
 other office rituals could serve to set a boundary and define those situations in which
 the two persons are allowed to disagree strongly as belonging strictly to the office
 setting, so that the impact of a conflict on their familial relationship will be mini-
 mized. Ritual forms, by limiting the ways in which conflicts can be expressed, might
 also prevent conflicts from becoming personal or total. Contrary to the belief that the
 Confucian esteem for harmony prevents a realistic treatment of social conflicts,
 Confucius recommended that competition, and by extension disagreement and
 conflict, should be limited to the necessary and appropriate, and, most important, it
 should be carried out according to ritual (Analects 3.7). Although it could degrade
 into mere legitimation, ritually structured conflict will not undermine harmony, and
 at times might even enhance it.
 Law versus Ritual
 But does not this exaltation of ritual ignore the fact that laws and rights are required
 to protect the weak from the strong in human society, where conflicts are ineradi-
 cable? Even those willing to concede that Confucianism does not explicitly reject
 individual liberty and is not inherently authoritarian are often skeptical of the possi-
 bility of making room for liberty within Confucian society without some institutional
 structure to protect liberty, which is seen as being constantly under threat from social
 and governmental oppression. Such structures usually include a certain kind of legal
 system. Defenders of Western liberal democracy, Ronald Dworkin among them, in-
 sist that the rule of law is crucial to the protection of individual liberty.
 With greater sensitivity to the importance of community, laws could also be
 used to protect communities. However, legal protection alone is unlikely to be ade-
 quate in building community. Indeed, if a society resorts too much to the legal sys-
 tem to resolve its problems, law could be counterproductive for community; such
 excess is of course not necessitated by the rule of law itself.1" Litigation inclines
 people toward selfishness by requiring them to think in terms of themselves as being
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 opposed to others, thus undermining trust and reducing the chances of harmonious
 association thereafter. Even when functioning well, litigation often focuses on prob-
 lems of economic or social distribution, material compensation, or retribution. A
 community is not simply a group of people living together to optimize their share of
 goods and rights vis-a-vis other groups. An individual as a member of a community
 thinks not in terms of "mine and others' " but in terms of "ours." A community does
 not just fight for a share of the societal pie with other groups or individuals; it is
 capable of creating goods shared by its members.
 Communal goods may require legal protection in an environment that is hostile
 or potentially hostile. But, over a long period, the frequent use of laws to protect
 itself from a hostile environment is self-destructive for a community. A community
 must transform its environment into one that is conducive to its own growth and the
 growth of other communities; a purely defensive response to a hostile environment
 will eventually undermine the quality of its own constitutive relationships and per-
 vert community ties into something oppressive. The need to constantly protect itself
 will lead to the development of a siege mentality of "us" versus "them," or what
 Richard Sennett has called "the ethos of the ghetto."16 Suspicion and hostility to-
 ward "outsiders" could foster an intolerance of differences internally. This would
 result in relations that stifle individual creativity and the liberty of the members of a
 community.
 A key insight in the Analects is that laws alone, at least when they are purely
 punitive, cannot create or sustain community. In Confucianism, ritual is contrasted
 with punishments and, by implication, punitive laws.
 The Master said, "Lead the people with administrative injunctions (zheng i) and keep
 them orderly with penal law (xing Jfi) and they will avoid punishments but be without
 a sense of shame. Lead them with excellence (de If) and keep them orderly through
 observing ritual propriety (li A) and they will develop a sense of shame, and moreover,
 will order themselves." (Analects 2.3)
 Confucian leadership is concerned with more than administering a fair system of
 distribution or umpiring conflicts. Exemplary leaders must combine personal accom-
 plishments with the achievement of community through their authoritative conduct
 (Analects 6.30). A Confucian community is achieved and sustained not through the
 sanctions and punishments of a legal system, however fair it might be, but through
 authoritative leadership that brings about spontaneous order among its members.
 This does not mean that Confucians must totally reject the use of litigation and the
 rule of law. But the coercive nature of laws implied in the penalties imposed on
 transgressors renders laws inefficacious in achieving harmony, and therefore inade-
 quate in creating community.
 There is an unfortunate tendency to obfuscate or reduce the difference between
 ritual and laws in contemporary scholarship. While stressing that there is room for
 flexibility within any ideal Confucian li, many scholars nevertheless treat it as being
 about "rules," external constraints imposed on individuals' behavior for the sake of
 social harmony. Wm. Theodore de Bary considers li "a basic constitutional order"
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 and argues that "there was a considerable overlap in the conceptions of 'rites' and
 'laws' in Confucian usage."17 Acknowledging that Mencius used fa &, the modern
 translation for "law," to designate "model institutions of the sage kings" as well as
 the laws advocated by the Legalists, de Bary, focusing on Song-Ming Neo-Confucian
 thought, adopts "law(s)" as the translation of fa in the Confucian context.
 The further back one goes in time, the more misleading it is to view Chinese "fa"
 according to the modern concept of "law." Confucian fa, which could be consid-
 ered close to ritual, was not the tool of rational bureaucracy or brutal realpolitik; it
 comprised codes deeply embedded within the religious and ritual practices of the
 society from which they emerged.18 The fa that could be translated as laws in the
 modern sense, with coercion implied in its enforcement, could only be the Legalist fa
 or something close to it. Moreover, if we remember that the ruler is not "equal under
 the law" in Legalist thought, then we would be persuaded that pre-Qin Chinese
 thought actually had no concept of law, in the sense of "universal propositions with
 either descriptive or prescriptive necessity."19
 It is critical to an adequate understanding of Confucian community to maintain
 the difference between ritual and law. Ritual operates through transformative influ-
 ence, law by coercive sanctions and punishments. Historically, social institutions
 that have been called li in traditional Chinese society were often degenerate forms
 that also worked through coercion. If Confucian ritual is to have contemporary
 meaning and use, we must move away from conceiving it in terms of coercive con-
 straints. Only in doing so can we see that a Confucian community created and sus-
 tained by ritual is one in which its members are free. Just as personal cultivation and
 community creation are mutually implicated, so are community and liberty.
 The difference between ritual and law reveals that when properly conducted,
 ritual does not deprive its participants of liberty through coercion. Despite later
 views that li "works from the outside," the Analects challenges the characterization
 of ritual as external constraints.20 People who were only concerned with externals
 exasperated Confucius, who insisted that ritual did not merely have to do with "gifts
 of jade and silk" (Analects 17.11). If one does not feel the appropriate emotion and
 adopt the appropriate attitude, there is no point in adhering to rituals, which become
 nothing but empty formalities (Analects 3.4, 3.26, 17.21, 19.1). Tu Wei-ming argues
 that there is historical and textual evidence to emphasize the dynamic process rather
 than the static structure of ritual. Ritual works only if the external form and internal
 content are balanced.21 Coerced performance defeats the purpose and could never
 amount to genuine ritual practice.
 Ritual as Semiotic Structure
 I have been discussing community as if it were self-evident what it is, when there
 exists a huge literature arguing about its definition. Liberals often complain that
 communitarians have no clear definition of "community." Sometimes, when liberals
 claim a concern about community, communitarians disparage the adequacy of their
 understanding of "community." It will not be possible to find a conception of com-
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 munity that will satisfy everyone. But a working understanding is certainly needed.
 For this, I draw on John Dewey's understanding of community, which I consider
 particularly appropriate to this discussion since, for Dewey, democracy "is the idea
 of community itself."22
 There is more than a verbal tie between common, community and communication. Men
 live in a community by virtue of the things which they have in common; and communi-
 cation is the way in which they come to possess things in common. (Democracy and
 Education)23
 A community is a regulative ideal designating a group of individuals who achieve
 shared goals and goods through communication and other activities among them-
 selves and with others. Communication is of course found not only in communities.
 In a community, communication not only enables joint undertakings but also
 achieves a sharing of emotions and ideas. A Deweyan community sees its primary
 task as the realization of communication in the most profound way possible.24 Part
 of the difficulty of trying to distinguish a community from society or other social
 groups arises because the differences are mostly qualitative. It is in the quality of
 communication, rather than in exclusionary boundaries or oppressive homogeneity,
 that we will find the commonality of community.
 Anthropologists have noted the centrality of communication in ritual, and ritual
 figures prominently in cultural approaches that are gaining influence in communi-
 cation studies today. Communication involves transactions using signs. Semiotic
 structures give social processes, including those of community, continuity and sta-
 bility.25 Confucian ritual is a semiotic structure. The early Chinese script for li depicts
 a sacrificial vessel; it referred to religious rituals practiced in ancient China. Rituals
 were attempts to communicate with nature, with cosmic forces, with deities and
 ancestors, to bring satisfactory outcomes to joint human enterprises. As Clifford
 Geertz observed, albeit in a different cultural context, religion is a social institution,
 worship a social activity, and faith a social force. Ancient Chinese religious rites
 were often symbolic reenactments of cooperative tasks of great import-for exam-
 ple, those related to the cultivation of crops or the waging of battles-in which
 participants also communicate with one another, acknowledging their interdepen-
 dence, reaffirming their mutual trust and commitment to shared goals. According to
 the Zhongyong, ancestral worship clarifies and reinforces the order within the clan/
 family-it rehearses symbolically the attitudes that various individuals should adopt
 toward one another according to the way they are related.26
 As the "magical" element loses its importance, or credibility, human communi-
 cation becomes more important and ensures the persistence of ritual. Today, en-
 gaging in ancestor worship need not mean that one believes in the ability of dead
 ancestors to influence our lives through occult means; the significance of the ritual
 can lie more in what it conveys about one's relationship with those who have gone
 before us, and those who will come later. The ritual honoring of dead ancestors
 plays an important role in the building of what Tu Wei-ming calls a fiduciary com-
 munity. In a broader context, Bruce Lincoln believes that ritual is "an authoritative
 58 Philosophy East & West
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 mode of symbolic discourse and a powerful instrument for the evocation of those
 sentiments (affinity and estrangement) out of which society is constructed."27 It plays
 an important role in sustaining human communities, and some see its loss as a criti-
 cal contributing factor to various forms of social pathology and individual psycho-
 logical malfunction. Some argue that rituals are necessary and inevitable phenom-
 ena in any culture.28
 Rituals have established and maintained the Chinese social and political realm
 for thousands of years. "He who understands the ceremonial sacrifices to heaven
 and earth, and the several sacrifices to the ancestors, would find governing a king-
 dom as easy as looking into his palm."29 Rituals facilitate government. Angela Zito's
 study of the Grand Sacrifices during the eighteenth century shows ritual as a tech-
 nique of imperial rule. By establishing the emperor as the privileged exemplar of
 correct embodiment and perfect practice, the imperial court produced and at-
 tempted to control the meaning and value that extended to every corner of Chinese
 life. Such hegemonic attempts were not new in Chinese history. They varied in their
 success and did not go uncontested.30 Successful ritual hegemony is not a thing of
 the past; Huang Shaorong's study of the Cultural Revolution reveals the importance
 of rituals in understanding the political communication in the movement. Ritual as a
 key form of political communication is relevant not only to Chinese politics because
 of its unique Confucian past; the concept has also been employed in, for example,
 contemporary studies of American presidential campaigns, among other things.31
 The effectiveness of ritual as a technique of political control is due to the state's
 ability to control the semiotic structure of rituals, as well as to the pervasiveness of
 this structure in the daily life of the people. The significance of ritual goes beyond
 the political, and its results are not limited to the sinister and oppressive. Within the
 ritual semiotic structure lies rich possibilities for personal and communal growth. In
 Confucianism, ritual comprises the ways of being human that are necessary to social
 order. Contemporary scholars like Rothenbuhler, without any reference to Confu-
 cianism, also argue that "ritual is necessary to humane living together."32 Whether
 in premodern China or modern societies, we find important rituals such as rites of
 passage celebrating birth, coming of age, marriage, and death; these mark significant
 moments in human life, moments of transition between key stages of the life cycle
 and between significant social territories.33 These moments of closure and beginning
 anew signify important changes in human relationships.
 The meaning of such moments is constructed through communal participation, a
 sharing of ideas and emotions through ritual acts that create and strengthen the
 relationships that constitute community. The "coming of age" ritual embodies an
 acknowledgment on everyone's part of a key development in a person's relationship
 to various others and her position in the community-which implies changes in
 expectations and demands on her future conduct and in what she in turn may expect
 and demand from others. Funeral rituals embody the meaning of the life and death
 of the departed for the mourners. A funeral celebrates and honors the work and
 achievement of the departed; it expresses the grief of the living and sometimes their
 commitment to the continuity of the words and deeds of the dead.34
 Sor-hoon Tan 59
This content downloaded from 202.161.43.77 on Wed, 01 Aug 2018 03:57:33 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Rituals-for example, those regarding dress, greetings, and behavior on various
 social occasions-also facilitate everyday interactions. Introducing a Royal Society
 of London discussion on the "Ritualization of Behavior in Animals and Man," Julian
 Huxley used "ritualization" to denote the "adaptive formalization and canalization
 of motivated human activities so as to secure more effective communicatory ('sig-
 naling') function, reduction of intra-group damage, or better intra-group bonding."
 Ritual is a way of mobilizing individuals "as self-regulating participants in social
 encounters." As an important part of human interaction, relevant across cultures,
 ritual has been defined as conventional acts of display through which one or more
 participants communicate information concerning themselves.35 As a generic kind
 of social action, ritual is neither archaic nor exclusively Chinese. Herbert Fingarette
 argues that although external forms vary from culture to culture and generation to
 generation, there remains a vast area of human experience wherein interaction is
 ritual: promises, commitments, excuses, pleas, compliments, pacts. Studying ritual
 as a form of communication, Rothenbuhler goes so far as to claim that ritual is an
 aspect or element of all social action.36
 Some psychological studies indicate that ritual acts play a critical role in human
 development. Early infant learning and the subsequent ability to learn may depend
 on the communication that takes place in what Eric Erikson calls "the daily rituals of
 greeting and nurturance" between infant and caregiver. Victor Turner and Erving
 Goffman have analyzed various ritual elements in the everyday interaction of con-
 temporary societies.37 The relevance of the concept of ritual to studies of modern
 societies and contemporary experience has been gaining greater acceptance among
 sociologists, social psychologists, and others. Anthony Giddens sees it as part of a
 wider sociological interest in symbolic forms rooted in the concern in philosophical,
 linguistic, and anthropological studies with problems of meaning.38
 In rituals, the meanings and values shared by the community are embodied in
 certain forms of speech and action and the use of certain kinds of objects. As the
 embodiment of shared meanings and values of specific occasions within the context
 of the relationships in which the participants stand to each other in their overlapping
 social networks, ritual guides action so that better coordination can be achieved with
 less effort than would be possible if one had to search anew for the appropriate way
 of interacting in every situation. Ritual is the outcome of, and in turn it contributes to,
 the striving to make stability of meaning prevail over the instability of events in hu-
 man interactions. It does more than facilitate interaction; it structures the very way
 we make sense of our world and assign meanings and values to various entities,
 phenomena, and relationships. According to Fingarette, "we learn and practice the li
 of our culture not because we find it to be right, but by virtue of its defining for us
 what we are to value as right."39
 Any set of rituals constituting a community's total semiotic structure, exclusive
 and comprehensive, would imply a single valid perspective and a closed notion of
 human perfection, which seems to leave little room for creativity and individuality.40
 While we should not jump to the conclusion that this automatically implies an in-
 tolerance of diversity that will lead to some form of totalitarian society, such a dan-
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 ger is undeniable. Should any individual or group succeed in imposing its semiotic
 structure on others, it would achieve hegemonic control over the latter's sense of
 reality and value. Indoctrination, "brainwashing," results in what appears as "vol-
 untary" compliance, but is in fact the most insidious destruction of individual liberty.
 Such betrayals of liberty are also detrimental to community. We could criticize
 them within the Confucian ritual context if we understood that ritual at its best is an
 artistic performance. The perversions of imposed practices become apparent when
 we compare them with the exemplary performances. The difference between the
 harmony of a community created by ritual and the indoctrinated homogeneity of a
 totalitarian society lies in the flexibility and creativity individuals are able to exercise
 within the shared semiotic structures. Confucianism is not restricted to a totalistic,
 closed conception of its ideal and a rigid semiotic structure of ritual grounding the
 ideal. The structure should be open and dynamic, leaving room for creativity and
 liberty. To understand better how this is possible, we need to examine more closely
 the artistic dimensions of ritual practice.
 I do not deny that art can be used to serve the political ends of domination. All
 semiotic structures are vulnerable to manipulation to determine the way people who
 use them understand, appraise, prescribe, and consequently act.41 Nor is this the
 occasion to argue that such uses of art betray artistic ideals. Instead of arguing that
 liberation is essential to any artistic endeavor, this essay is making a weaker claim
 that, as an artistic endeavor, ritual can liberate individuals even while it harmonizes
 their relations for community. This essay limits itself to discussing how ritual could
 balance liberty and community rather than argue that it invariably does so. One's
 semiotic structures may bind one with the most powerful chains that human beings
 have been able to fashion, or may place in one's hands the most powerful of all
 instruments for individual liberation and communal reconstruction.42 Whether ritual
 achieves the balance between liberty and community in any specific case will de-
 pend largely on what individuals do as potential members of communities.
 Ritual as Art
 Confucian ritual is closely associated with poetry and music. In Confucian educa-
 tion, exemplary communication is inspired by the Songs, established through ritual
 and consummated in music (Analects 8.8). Confucius admonished his son, "If you
 do not study the Songs, you will be at a loss as to what to say" (Analects 16.13). Skill
 in quoting the Songs (Shi , sometimes translated as the Odes) is a form of ritual
 mastery. Quoting poetry or other classical works to express one's sentiments has
 been a feature of Chinese banquet rituals since the Warring States period.43 Appro-
 priate quotation involves the use of expressive and presentational forms the mean-
 ings of which have been shaped by previous usage, passed from generation to gen-
 eration as part of the cultural legacy. Yet it is not without room for creativity: these
 forms, when used appropriately in new situations, have had to accommodate new
 meanings that enrich the present content of the forms without erasing all previous
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 contents. In the same way, a musical composition is richer for having been played
 by different master musicians without losing its identity.
 The close association of ritual with poetry and music is further elaborated by
 Eno's characterization of early Confucians as "masters of dance," employing dance
 as a guiding metaphor in his inspiring study of early Confucianism. Dance is music
 and poetry in motion. "Dance, as an expressive form of thinking, sensing, feeling
 and moving, which may reflect or influence the individual and the society," is an
 extremely appropriate metaphor for ritual practice.44 It is the art form that provides
 the best parallel to ritual both in its multisensory modalities, which enable it to
 engage participants at many levels of experience, and in the centrality of movement
 in its performance. Mencius describes moral achievement in terms of an unstop-
 pable experience of joy that expresses itself in dance (Mencius 4A27). Book 10 of
 the Analects describes in loving detail the Master's gestures, postures, bodily move-
 ments, and facial expressions. In ritual practice, the body and its parts are vehicles of
 meaning, embodiments of value. Through performances that fully engage the vari-
 ous dimensions of participants' personalities, ritual reconstructs situations to effect
 affective and cognitive transformations in the relationships (between different par-
 ticipants as well as between participants and audience) that constitute both persons
 and community.
 We could better understand the difference asserted earlier between indoctrina-
 tion and ritual by considering the distinction between dancing mechanically (as
 even animals can be trained to do through operant conditioning) and dancing artis-
 tically, which requires skills in symbolization, emotional expression, agility of move-
 ment, and the ability to use syntactically novel forms without being trained in the
 phrases of that form. If we take the syntax of a dance "language" as "a finite system
 of conventions describing how the realm of semantic interpretation is related to
 movement realization ... new sequences of movement and gesture never previously
 encountered may (nevertheless) be created and understood by the audience."45 Rit-
 ual, like dance, can and should be an open, productive semiotic system that can
 accommodate as well as create new meanings.
 The potential for innovation in ritual is recognized in the Analects, notwith-
 standing the popularity of conservative readings. Confucius did not reject all
 changes in ritual (Analects 9.3). He followed the rituals of the Zhou, who had
 learned and improved on the practices of earlier dynasties (Analects 3.14). For him,
 a teacher's work is not merely transmitting a mummified past to future generations;
 the teacher must revitalize the past so that it is embodied in the different experience
 of the present (Analects 2.11). Confucius' characterization of himself as a transmitter
 rather than a creator (shu er bu zuo ilMTd1~) attests more to his modesty than to a
 denial of creativity. Confucian sagehood is closely associated with creativity (zuo M)
 in the Book of Rites: "One who creates is called sagely; one who transmits is called
 perspicacious. A perspicacious sage means one who transmits and creates."46 Given
 that Confucius repeatedly denied being a sage, it is not surprising that he should also
 consider himself falling short of creativity. We need not be pessimistic or elitist about
 the human capacity for creativity.
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 As an artistic performance, ritual requires a creative projection of unique per-
 sonality and a personal investment of meaning, which paradoxically can dissolve
 personal boundaries, creating altered states of consciousness often described as
 "self-transcendence," wherein a soaring, oceanic sense of oneness with others, with
 the universe, occurs. Eno compares the ritual experience of the Great Oneness (taiyi
 ,-) with the modern psychological analysis of skill performance, where a similar
 combination of perfect self-mastery and self-transcendence is manifest.47 A merging
 of liberation and interpersonal harmony, which is what we are searching for in pro-
 posing that ritual could balance liberty and community, is also found in Peter Her-
 shock's description of improvised music, as in the Double Quartet's "Free Jazz":
 We are not making music, but are being continuously remade, reborn by it. Losing our
 boundaries, slipping into incandescent concourse which is the essence of musical im-
 provisation, we no longer anticipate or follow our fellow musicians but are released into
 an unmitigated oneness in which anything can occur even though absolutely nothing is
 lacking.48
 It is in the artistic dimension of ritual that we find the improvement of the quality of
 relationships and the concomitant refinement of sensibilities, the sharpening of per-
 ceptions and judgment, that brings together personal and communal achievement.
 The balance of liberty and community achieved in consummatory ritual perfor-
 mances has an effect beyond these occasions. The participants are more likely on
 future occasions to achieve a similar balance with one another and, more difficult
 but still possible, with others. Ritual forms that have proved successful previously
 in achieving such balance could work for different groups of participants and in-
 crease their chances of success compared with situations without a similar semiotic
 structure.
 Virtuosic Liberty in Confucian Community
 What kind of liberty is being balanced with community in this discussion of the
 artistic dimension of ritual? To get a clearer picture of Confucian liberty, I shall
 focus on the process of personal cultivation, which is critical to Confucian personal-
 communal realization. We find an account of the process in relation to Confucius in
 the Analects:
 The Master said: "From fifteen, my heart-and-mind was set upon learning; from thirty I
 took my stance; from forty I was no longer doubtful; from fifty I realized the propensities
 of tian; from sixty my ear was attuned; from seventy, I could give my heart-and-mind free
 rein without overstepping the boundaries. (Analects 2.4)
 Personal cultivation begins with an act of liberty: "setting one's heart-and-mind"
 translates "zhi," which has also been rendered into "will" or "purpose."49 Learning,
 contrary to popular misunderstanding, is not just rote learning in Confucian educa-
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 tion. The Analects stresses the need to combine reflection, thinking (si), with learning
 (Analects 2.15). A student must think for herself, going beyond what her teacher tells
 her. Confucius requires that a student, "if shown one corner, return with the other
 three" (Analects 7.8). One corner is insufficient to determine the other three without
 also stipulating the size of the square. A student could give a good response that the
 teacher never even considered. Learning involves more than uncreative following or
 copying. At the risk of overinterpreting, this is a suggestive aspect of Confucius'
 metaphor of teaching-learning.
 Taking one's stance requires orienting oneself to the rest of the world; it involves
 finding or creating a proper place for oneself in a wider, emerging scheme of things.
 This is done through ritual, with its combination of constraint in the form of self-
 discipline and creativity in endowing each act with personal significance.50 Having
 a sense of one's place in a wider scheme of things means greater coherence in one's
 experience; one can make better sense of what is happening and thereby find one's
 way forward without being "in doubt." "Realizing the propensities of tian" is both
 understanding our social and natural environment on an extensive scale and being
 able to "fit" in, not passively, but by actively interacting with it. The picture of liberty
 emerging is one of smooth interaction with one's environment. One becomes more
 free, more powerful, when obstructions decrease or are more easily dissolved in the
 communicative processes between oneself and the rest of the world.
 Personal-communal cultivation achieves virtuosity in communication, in inter-
 acting with one's environment. Hence, Confucius' "ear was attuned" from sixty. The
 Shuowen lexicon gives the meaning of sheng T as "to communicate" (tong ).51
 The "sage" is associated with virtuosity in hearing and speaking (communication).
 The "ear" (er 4) component associates the sage with "hearing" (ting N) and
 "keenness of hearing" (cong 0). Keenness of hearing, indicating a more general
 sensitivity, is associated with intelligence (congming 1,MA8 in modern Mandarin). To be intelligent, to be good at solving problems, interacting better with the environ-
 ment, is to be keen of hearing (sensitive) and clear-sighted (perceptive). This virtu-
 osity is the liberty to achieve one's goals and to have goals that are more "in tune"
 with our environment. The goals are "in tune" through a process of mutual rather
 than one-sided adjustment. A sage attunes himself to the world by sometimes "tun-
 ing" the world and sometimes "tuning" himself.
 Confucius, "from seventy, followed what his heart-and-mind desired without
 overstepping the boundaries." This is the highest level of virtuosic liberty. It is greater
 in scope and finer in quality than the liberty of "setting his heart-and-mind on learn-
 ing." Following one's desires without overstepping the boundaries is a situation
 where mastery of skills transcends rules without lapsing into arbitrariness; it is not
 about the mechanical compliance resulting from a complete "internalization" of
 externally imposed rules. Confucius' freedom is not that of a man who grew to love
 his chains--a case of "internalizing" coercive external constraints. Internalization
 through conditioning results in rigid behavior. In situations that do not map exactly
 onto the landscape in which conditioning has taken place, the judgment of what is
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 appropriate is impaired, and response lacks efficacy. Virtuosic liberty may begin
 with the application of rules. If the application requires a secondary set of rules of
 application, one would be trapped in an infinite regress. The appropriate application
 of rules in practice is an art that has to be mastered experientially. One does not
 overstep the boundaries at the stage that Confucius was supposed to have achieved
 at seventy not just because successful personal-communal cultivation has ensured
 that one's desires are all ethical, but also because one's improved judgment of where
 the boundaries are in any situation is also superior to others. The sage's ethical
 leadership becomes especially important in new situations. A sage sets the ethical
 standards by leading the way in showing others where these boundaries are.
 One may force another to follow a way, but she cannot be coerced into "real-
 izing (zhi %1) it" (Analects 8.9), which requires integrating the way with one's expe-
 rience through learning and reflecting, and developing the understanding and judg-
 ment to respond appropriately to any situation. "Becoming authoritative in one's
 conduct [i.e., personal-communal cultivation] is self-originating, how could it origi-
 nate with others?" (Analects 12.1). It is not surprising that Zhang Dongsun and others
 identified zide il, "getting it in, by, and for oneself," as the closest Confucian
 equivalent of "liberty."52 As Mencius described the process, "an exemplary person
 steeps himself in the way because he wishes to attain it in himself. When he attains it
 in himself, he will be at ease in it; when he is at ease in it, he can draw deeply upon
 it; when he can draw deeply upon it, he finds its source wherever he turns."53 When
 the way is in oneself, it is constantly renewed, for it flows from, and with, one's
 experience; it becomes one's experience, made more coherent and more meaning-
 ful through cultivating oneself.
 While personal cultivation cannot be accomplished in isolation, the contribution
 of others must come in the form of efficacious communication. Any attempt to "force
 people to be free" or to determine through coercion or indoctrination a person's
 semiotic structures and consequent behavior would be self-defeating as a means to
 liberty. We may illustrate this with Mencius' story of the man from Song "who pulled
 at his rice plants because he was worried about their failure to grow."54 The man
 thought he was "helping the rice plants grow" when, in fact, he was killing them.
 Plants sometimes grow better with human interference-through watering when rain
 is insufficient, digging trenches to drain the soil when rain is too abundant, fertiliz-
 ing, et cetera-but pulling at them is not one of the ways to help them grow.
 Others may help us cultivate ourselves-by deliberately teaching us, unintention-
 ally providing a model or an example of what not to do, providing various needed
 economic and social conditions, challenging our views, criticizing our actions-
 but coercion and indoctrination will not help us become cultivated. It is one's
 own efforts and success in integrating learning with reflection, thereby improving
 both sensitivity and judgment, that make the achievement a realization of oneself
 rather than the making of an automaton following good orders efficiently. It is only
 when cultivated relational individuals ritually communicate and participate in joint
 endeavors with virtuosic liberty that there is Confucian community.
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 Notes
 A shorter version of this article was presented as a paper at the 2001 Beijing Inter-
 national Conference on Political Philosophy, organized by the Chinese Academy of
 Social Sciences and the Philosophy Summer School in China, and published in
 Mandarin under the title, "Liberty versus Community: A Confucian Perspective on
 Democracy's Dilemma," in a volume of selected conference papers (Beijing: Chi-
 nese Academy of Social Science Press, 2003). This revised article has benefited from
 the comments of the PEW reviewers and my colleagues at the National University of
 Singapore. Any remaining errors and omissions are solely my responsibility.
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